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SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-94-

ST A T E OF MAINE
K EN N EBEC COU N TY, SS.

)
M AIN E E Y E CARE, P .A ., a Maine
)
corporation with a principal place o f
)
business in Waterville, County o f Kennebec, )
State o f Maine,

)

)
Plaintiff,

)

v.

)

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND
INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM
OF LAW

)
D EBO R A H H O FFER T, M .D ., o f
Mt. Vernon, County o f Kennebec,
State o f Maine,

)
)
)

)
Defendant.

)

)

MOTION
NOW COM ES plaintiff, by and through counsel, and moves this Honorable Court to enter
a temporary restraining order prohibiting defendant from practicing any form o f ophthalmology, from
opening an office for the practice o f any form o f ophthalmology, and more particularly from
practicing retina surgery within the geographical boundaries established in paragraph 11 (Limitation
o f Practice) o f the Employment Agreement between the parties (copy attached as Exhibit A), from
soliciting any o f plaintiffs current patients to become patients o f defendant, and from soliciting any
o f plaintiffs current employees to come to work for her, pending hearing and determination o f
plaintiffs prayer for a preliminary injunction, on the ground that immediate and irreparable injury,
loss, and damage will result to plaintiff during the pendency o f this proceeding and before a
preliminary injunction can be entered.

BERMAN & SIMMONS, P.A.
129 LISBON STREET • P.O. BOX 961 - LEWISTON. MAINE 04243-0961

DATED:

November 10, 1994.

\tflLLIAM D. R O BIT Z EK , ESQ .
Attorney for Plaintiff

RULE 7(b)(1) NOTICE
Memorandum o f law or other materials in opposition to this motion pursuant to M .R . Civ. P.
7(c) must be filed not later than 21 days after the filing o f the motion unless another time is provided
by the rules or set by the court. Failure to file timely opposition to this motion waives all objections
to the motion, which may be granted without further notice or hearing.
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December 8,1994
Nancy Desjardin, Clerk
Kennebec County Superior Court
95 State Street
Augusta, ME 04330
Re:

Maine Eye Care Associates v. Hofferb No. CV-94-469

Dear Nancy:
Enclosed for filing in the above case, and in relation to the Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order scheduled for hearing tomorrow, are:
(a) Motion To Intervene Of Attorney General, State Of Maine; and
(b) Memorandum Of Law Of Attorney General, State Of Maine In Opposition
To Plaintiffs Motion For Temporary Restraining Order.
I would be most grateful if you could bring these papers to the attention of Justice
Perkins at your earliest convenience.
Please enter my appearance for the State Of Maine in this case, and please
note that I do plan to attend the hearing scheduled for tomorrow.
Thank you for your kind cooperation.

FRANCIS E. ACKERMAN
Assistant Attorney General
pc:

Paul Driscoll, Esq.
William Robitzek, Esq.

Pruned on Recycled Paper

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-94-469

MAINE EYE CARE
ASSOCIATES, P.A.,
Plaintiff
v.
DEBORAH HOFFERT,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MOTION TO INTERVENE OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
STATE OF MAINE

The Attorney General, State of Maine now applies to intervene in this action
pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. Rule 24 (a)(2). The reasons for this application are as follows.
1. The Attorney General is the chief law enforcement official of the State of
Maine, a sovereign state of the United States. As such, it is the Attorney General's
duty to act as parens patriae for the protection of the interests of the public, in cases
where those interests are implicated.
2. In the present case, Plaintiff, a professional association, seeks injunctive
relief to enforce against a physician, its former employee, a restrictive covenant
which, by its terms, would bar the Defendant from practicing ophthalmology for an
eighteen-month period in an area comprising intersecting circles having a thirtymile radius centered on Waterville and Bangor, Maine, respectively.
3. The Attorney General believes that the public interest would be harmed by
a grant of the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff in that:
(a) If Defendant is barred from practicing ophthalmology in the area of central
Maine defined in the restrictive covenant, no practitioner will be available to
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perform certain sophisticated ophthalmological procedures in this area, and
members of the public will be denied meaningful access to this specialized branch of
ophthalmological treatment; and
(b) If Defendant is barred from practicing ophthalmology in the area of central
Maine defined in the restrictive covenant, the number of practitioners available to
perform certain other sophisticated ophthalmological procedures in this area will be
reduced, and the level of competition among providers of such services will be
reduced, with the result that members of the public may be required to pay higher
prices, or accept lower quality services.
4. Disposition of Plaintiff's pending motion, to the extent the injunctive
relief sought is granted, will as a practical matter prevent the Attorney General from
protecting the public interests identified in the foregoing paragraph.
5. The public interest is not adequately represented by the Defendant, who is a
private party.
This motion is filed in conjunction with a memorandum of law in
opposition to a grant of the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff, which more fully
sets out the need for the Attorney General to intervene to protect the public interest.
WHEREFORE, the Attorney General's application to intervene in this action
should be granted.
Dated: £

,

-—'

M'jFRANCIS E. ACKERMAN
Assistant Attorney General
State House Station # 6
Augusta, ME 04333
(207) 626 8800

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-94-469

MAINE EYE CARE
ASSOCIATES, P.A.,
Plaintiff
v.
DEBORAH HOFFERT,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OF LAW OF
INTER VENOR ATTORNEY
GENERAL, STATE OF MAINE,
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

INTRODUCTION
The Attorney General has applied to intervene in this action pursuant to
M.R.Civ.P. Rule 24 (a) for the purpose of protecting the public interest. This
memorandum of law is now filed for the purpose of drawing the Court's attention
to certain public interest considerations which, in our view, militate strongly against
any grant of the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff in this case.
Plaintiff, Maine Eye Care Associates, P.A. ("MECA"), is a professional
association engaged in the provision of ophthalmological care from offices located
in Waterville and Bangor, Maine. Defendant Deborah Hoffert ("Hoffert") is a
practitioner in a specialty branch of ophthalmology known as retina treatment. A
former employee of MECA, Hoffert recently commenced her own, independent
professional practice from offices in Augusta and Bangor, Maine. In this lawsuit,
and in its pending motion for a temporary restraining order, MECA seeks to enforce
the terms of a restrictive covenant, ancillary to its employment contract with
Hoffert, by enjoining her from the practice of ophthalmology within a thirty-mile
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radius of Waterville and Bangor for an eighteen-month period.1
In order to obtain the relief it is seeking, MECA must, inter alia, demonstrate
that the public interest would not be adversely affected by the entry of an injunction.
Ingraham v. University of Maine at Orono. 441 A. 2d 691 (Me. 1982). In the Attorney
General's view, MECA has not satisfied, and cannot satisfy this standard. For the
reasons detailed below, the Attorney General takes the position that, in fact, a grant
of the injunctive relief sought would have an adverse impact on the interests of the
public in central Maine (a) in assuring access to medical care, including specialized
care, and (b) in maintaining some level of competition among medical providers, in
the central Maine area.2
ARGUMENT
THE PUBLIC INTEREST WOULD BE HARMED BY A GRANT OF THE
REQUESTED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
That the public in Maine in general, and in central Maine in particular, has
an important interest in ease of access to specialized medical care is a proposition
beyond debate. In addition, the public has an equally important, though perhaps less
dramatic interest in access to a choice of competing providers of ophthalmological,

1
The thirty-mile circles centered on Waterville and Bangor intersect. Thus, injunctive
enforcement of the restrictive covenant would, for example, bar Hoffert from practicing in: Augusta,
Belfast, Bucksport, Ellsworth, Farmington, Gardiner, Livermore Falls, Madison, Newport, Orono,
Skowhegan, Whitefield and Winthrop, as well as, of course, numerous other communities within the
intersecting circles.
2
The Attorney General takes no position at this time with respect to any aspect of
Plaintiff's damage claims.
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as well as other medical services.3 Both of these interests would be harmed by a
grant of the injunctive relief requested by Plaintiff in the pending motion, as we
argue below.
A. The Public's Interest In Access To Specialized Ophthalmological Care
Would Be Harmed By Injunctive Enforcement Of The Restrictive Covenant.
The Attorney General expects that evidence to be adduced at hearing on the
pending motion will show that there is a range of sophisticated ophthalmological
procedures which are provided in the central Maine area only by Hoffert.4 These
include various types of vitrectomies as well as certain other procedures. We further
expect that the evidence will show: (a) that Hoffert has performed a substantial
number of these procedures at Waterville's Mid-Maine Medical Center during the
approximate two-year period since she commenced practice in Maine; (b) that there
are few other practioners anywhere in Maine who are equipped to perform these
procedures; (c) that occasionally, these procedures must be performed on an
accelerated or, indeed, on an emergency basis; and (d) that the consequences of delay
in treating an emergency case in which one of these procedures is indicated can be
serious, and can include blindness.
3
Maine's commitment to free and fair competition in the marketplace as a matter of
public policy is reflected in state antitrust statutes. See Maine's mini-Sherman Act, 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1101
-1102; and the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.
4
It is noteworthy that Plaintiff concedes that there are procedures which Hoffert is
capable of performing and MECA is not. Motion For Temporary Restraining Order And Incorporated
Memorandum Of Law at 8. Plaintiff asserts that MECA is "in the process of hiring a locum tenens" to
perform these procedures. Id- Whether or not it will be successful in this effort is, however, a matter for
speculation. See Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic v. Petrozza, 373 S.E.2d 449, 454 (N.C.App. 1988) (in
considering whether to enter injunctive relief enforcing restrictive covenant against physician, evidence
concerning a possible new hiring by former employer was speculative, and would be disregarded).
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A grant of the requested injunctive relief would effectively deprive Hoffert of
the ability to perform any of these procedures in a broad stretch of central Maine. By
the same token, the public in central Maine would thereby be deprived of
meaningful access to this specialty branch of ophthalmological practice. The specific
consequences of such a deprivation could, in any given individual case, be
catastrophic.
Fortunately, the law does not require this Court to be blind to those
consequences. Rather, the Law Court has instructed that restrictive covenants
are contrary to public policy and will be enforced only
to the extent that they are reasonable and sweep no wider
than necessary to protect the business interests in issue.
Chapman & Drake v. Harrington, 545 A.2d 645, 647 (Me. 1988), quoting Lord v. Lord.
454 A.2d 830, 834 (Me. 1983). In Chapman & Drake, the Law Court upheld an award
of damages pursuant to a restrictive covenant in an insurance context, but strongly
implied that it would have viewed a claim for injunctive relief under the covenant
in that case as "sweeping ... wider than necessary". Indeed, Chapman & Drake's dicta
teach that enforcement of a restrictive covenant by means of an injunction in any
business context should be subjected to the most rigorous scrutiny.5
5
We note in passing that in order to obtain the requested injunctive relief, Plaintiff must
also demonstrate that it has suffered irreparable harm. Ingraham, supra. In Chapman & Drake, the
Law Court held that a damage award for violation of a restrictive covenant was supported by the
evidence. The damage award was based on a computation of the loss suffered by the plaintiff insurance
agency with respect to each customer lost to the defendant former employee -- in short, this was not an
award of liquidated damages. If, as Chapman & Drake strongly suggests, damages can be an adequate
remedy in such cases, it follows that courts should not lightly conclude that irreparable harm has been
suffered — at least in the absence of special circumstances. Plaintiff in this case has made no showing of
such special circumstances. See Dick v. Heist. 693 P.2d 1133,1137 (Ida.App. 1985) (in refusing injunctive
enforcement of restrictive covenant against physicians, court notes: "By our holding we do not suggest
that a breach of a restrictive covenant may allow no remedy .... [Tjhere remains the possibility of
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In a medical context, because of the immediacy and irreversible nature of the
potential consequences, the required level of scrutiny should, if anything, be even
more intense. And where injunctive enforcement would result in a denial of
convenient public access to specialized treatment, there can be no real question that
it is the requested injunctive relief, and not the public's access to treatment, which
must be denied. Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic v. Petrozza, 373 S.E.2d 449, 453
(N.C.App. 1988) (injunctive enforcement of restrictive covenant would violate
public policy where it would create a substantial question of harm to public health,
e.g.. by requiring patients to travel 45 miles for gastroenterological treatment); Dick
v. Geist. 693 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Ida.App. 1985) (injunctive enforcement of restrictive
covenant against neonatal specialists who had hitherto provided 90% of care for
critically ill newborns in subject community would harm public welfare); Damsey v.
Mankowitz. 339 So.2d 282,283 (Fla.App. 1976) (given compelling need for surgeon's
services in the community, injunctive enforcement of restrictive covenant against
him would jeopardize public health, and would be denied); and see Hoddesdon v.
Conroe Ear Nose & Throat Associates. P.A.. 751 S.W.2d 289, 290-291 (Tex.App. 1988)
(injunctive enforcement of restrictive covenant denied as to only ear, nose and
throat specialist in the community, noting that he had received no training or skills
from his former employer); Ellis v. McDaniel. 569 P.2d 222, 225 (Nev. 1979) (refusing
injunctive enforcement of restrictive covenant as to practitioner's orthopedic
collecting damages"); Metropolitan Medical Group v. Eaton. 546 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (N.Y.App. 1989)
(injunctive enforcement of restrictive covenant against psychologist denied where health care provider
failed to show it would suffer irreparable injury absent injunctive relief, since defendant could respond
in damages if former employer ultimately prevailed).
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surgery specialty, since enforcement would result in patients having to travel great
distances at considerable risk and expense, while ordering enforcement as to other
aspects of general medical practice).6
B. The Public's Interest In Access To The Ophthalmological Provider Of Its
Choice. And In Competition Among Providers. Would Be Harmed By
Injunctive Enforcement Of The Restrictive Covenant.
It is expected that the evidence which will be forthcoming at hearing on the
pending motion will show that, in addition to the range of sophisticated procedures
currently performed in central Maine only by Hoffert, there is also a range of
procedures which Hoffert performs in competition with one or more of the
physicians associated with MECA.*7 The procedures performed by both Hoffert and
MECA (the evidence will show) include various treatments for retinal detachment,
as well as certain other procedures. We further expect that, with respect to at least
some of these procedures, the evidence will indicate that few providers in the
central Maine area other than Hoffert and MECA are equipped to perform them.8
8
We anticipate that the evidence will make clear that injunctive relief barring Hoffert
from performing all procedures except those which she alone (i.e.. in central Maine) is capable of
performing would be inappropriate in this case. Specifically, it would be economically unfeasible for
her to attempt to go forward with such a truncated practice. In addition, as we argue below, the public
interest in maintaining competition in the market for ophthalmological treatment militates against
such a partial grant of the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff on this motion.
7
The argument offered in this section applies, mutatis mutandis, to those procedures
provided at MECA, as of the date of hearing or in the future, by a locum tenens hired for the purpose of
filling the gap left by Hoffert's departure.
8
The Attorney General is currently conducting an antitrust investigation for the purpose
of determining precisely how many players are involved in providing the specialized
ophthalmological services in view here in the relevant geographic market, and what market share can
be ascribed to each such player. It is not expected that this detailed information will be available as of
the date of hearing. However, we anticipate that the evidence to be introduced will be more than
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Again, injunctive enforcement of the restrictive covenant in this case would
effectively eliminate Hoffert as a provider of this category of treatments in the
central Maine area. As a result, the spectrum of providers to whom the public can
turn for such treatment would be narrowed. The consequences of a diminution of
competition in a relatively concentrated market, in terms of price, quality of service
or delay in treatment may be difficult to discern in individual cases, but are
nevertheless likely to be real.9
The Law Court's admonition to effect that restrictive covenants are contrary
to public policy, and that injunctive enforcement is particularly disfavored, bears
repetition here. Chapman & Drake, supra. And while no Maine case has specifically
applied this teaching in a medical context, other jurisdictions have drawn the
correct conclusion: where injunctive enforcement would appreciably narrow the
range of treatment alternatives open to the public, such enforcement should be
denied. Duffner v. Albertv. 718 S.W.2d 111, 113-114 (Ark.App. 1986) (injunctive
enforcement of restrictive covenant would unduly interfere with right of the public
to availability of choice of orthopedic surgeons); Williams v. Hobbs. 460 N.E. 2d 287,

sufficient to raise a serious question as to whether the reduction in competition which would result from
barring Hoffert from practice in central Maine would be consistent with the public interest. As long as
that question remains unanswered, we submit, the requested relief should be denied.
9
With respect to quality of service, see e^g. Affidavit of George Weir, submitted by
Defendant in this matter, at 1 1 0 , suggesting that Hoffert's departure from MECA resulted in the
assumption by one of the remaining MECA physicians, Dr. Steve Witkin, of a caseload inconsistent
with appropriate standards of care. In general, it may be noted that the entire canon of federal and
state merger law is premised on the theory that a trend toward concentration resulting in reduced
competition in any given market is likely to have an adverse impact on price, service or both. See e ^ - 10
M.R.S.A. 1102-A.
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290 (Oh.App. 1983) (injunctive enforcement of restrictive covenant refused where
ability to practice interventional radiology was a skill not common in the
community).
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, this Court should conclude that Plaintiff has
failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that a grant of the requested injunctive
relief would not have an adverse impact on the public interest. Accordingly,
Plaintiff's pending motion should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,

Dated: December 8,1994

r

FRANCIS E. ACKERMAN
Assistant Attorney General
State House Station # 6
Augusta, ME 04333
(207) 626 8800

